City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research

New York City College of Technology

2019

Lab‐Grown
Lab Grown Meat and Veganism: A Virtue‐Oriented
Virtue Oriented Perspective
Carlo Alvaro
CUNY New York City College of Technology

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/ny_pubs/351
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

C. Alvaro

1

Lab-Grown Meat and Veganism: A Virtue-Oriented Perspective DOI: 10.1007/s10806-019-09759-2

Lab-Grown Meat and Veganism: A Virtue-Oriented Perspective
Carlo Alvaro
Phone 9176581901
Email philonew@gmail.com
New York City College of Technology City University of New York Brooklyn, NY USA

Abstract
The project of growing meat artificially represents for some the next best thing to humanity.
If successful, it could be the solution to several problems, such as feeding a growing global
population while reducing the environmental impact of raising animals for food and, of
course, reducing the amount and degree of animal cruelty and suffering that is involved in
animal farming. In this paper, I argue that the issue of the morality of such a project has
been framed only in terms of the best consequences for the environment, animals, and
humans, or in terms of deontic principles. I argue that to appreciate how deep and difficult
this issue is, it is necessary to consider it in terms of a virtue-oriented approach. Such an
approach will reveal aspects that are not apparent, not contemplated by typical approaches,
but are essential to our understanding of the morality of lab-grown meat. As I argue,
evaluating the issue from a virtue-oriented perspective suggests that the project of in vitro
meat should not be supported because it stems from unvirtuous motivations.
AQ1
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As human ingenuity progresses, new moral questions present themselves. Nowadays,
technology has come to the point where human and animal parts can be grown in a
laboratory. As aptly described by an article in the Smithsonian Magazine (Vogel 2010) with
the suggestive title, “Organs Made to Order”, scientists are now able to build replacement
body parts from the cells of a patient. And in August 2013, Professor Mark Post created the
first in vitro burger at the University of Maastricht. Leaving aside the morality of growing
human parts in a lab for medical use, our question is this: Is growing meat in a laboratory
ethical and worth pursuing? This question is tremendously interesting especially to ethical
vegans. An ethical vegan is one who avoids consuming animal food or using animal
products. The typical argument for ethical veganism is that eating animal food and using
products derived from the exploitation of animals is immoral because animals feel pain, and
also because animal agriculture is one of the leading causes of environmental degradation.
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There are many ethical vegans who avoid animal food because they do not like the taste of
meat. However, there are also many who wish there was a way to eat it if meat were cruelty
free and environmentally friendly. Lab-grown meat is purported to be the solution. In fact, if
scientists can make it taste identical to “real” meat, animals will no longer be required, and
consequently the impact on the environment will be reduced. Thus lab-grown meat seems to
be like manna from heaven. What else do we need to know? If the question is, “Is growing
meat in a lab a moral practice” it would seem that the answer is simple: Yes it is! Even
those ethical vegans who like meat but abstain from eating it for ethical reasons could
welcome and consume artificial meat (a very strange form of veganism, though). After all,
isn’t the prospect of eliminating animal suffering and saving the environment exactly what
ethical vegans have been fighting for? It would seem that if meat is produced artificially
reducing environmental damage, and no animal is disrespected or hurt, ethical vegans would
have nothing more to complain about.
But it is not that simple. There are certain issues to be considered. For example, at present,
animals still have to be used in the production of cultured meat. Whether painful or painless,
animals must be reared so that their cells can be harvested to produce in vitro meat.
Consequently, lab-grown meat still involves animal exploitation, which is what the
proponents of artificially grown meat want to avoid. It might be the case that researchers or
the FDA or any other entity argue that eating in vitro meat is risk-free. They could say that
lab-grown meat is safe and non-carcinogen or in any way bad for human health. But how
could they possibly know about long-term effects? My main concern is this: if it is meat,
whether lab or factory grown, it is still meat, and thus unhealthful to humans. (Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, n.d., “Health & Environmental
Implications”) Furthermore, it would seem that meat eaters, at least at present, do not like
the idea of eating something made in a laboratory. Granted, it is possible that in the future
they will overcome their squeamishness. However, it is reasonable to believe that not all
meat eaters will. Thus, lab-grown meat may never completely replace traditional animal
farming, but rather be just another option: “Which steak, sir? Lab-grown or farm-grown?”
Consequently, growing synthetic meat might just make little to no difference to the current
state of animals being raised for food.
But assume that in the future lab-grown meat will become readily available, cruelty-free,
affordable, environmentally safe, and taste the same as real meat, (call this the “desirable
outcome thesis”) what would then be the moral problem? In my view, what could still be
said against lab-grown meat is to point out its unvirtuous motivation. Namely, why are we
humans even contemplating eating food that is produced synthetically in laboratories, given
the abundance of naturally grown plant-based food? By framing the question of lab-grown
meat in terms of virtue, creating meat in a laboratory just seems obstinate and evinces lack
of temperance and a misunderstanding of the role of food in human flourishing. Are we
supposed, as humanity, to place so much importance to food that we are willing to create it
in laboratories? A virtue-based approach can make sense of this issue in a way that other
theories cannot, because it does not stop at the consideration of what is most convenient or
what is our duty. A virtue-based approach considers the motivation and character of
individuals. What are the virtues and how can they help? Particularly the virtue of
temperance can make us see what is wrong with cultured meat. If we judge from the
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perspective of temperance, we realize that the issue of cloned meat is not merely whether or
not such meat is cruelty-free or it tastes like real meat.
In a well-known paper, Anscombe (1958) pointed out that we should drop the idea of
obligation altogether. And that is what we need to do if we wish to understand the morality
of lab-grown meat. The current discussion is focused on the rightness or wrongness of such
an endeavor. But all along there is an important question, the question of character, which is
being marginalized by the practicality of achieving viable lab-grown meat. Virtue ethics has
the advantage of making sense of this issue by shifting the focus of the discussion over the
character of the individual. It shows that the best approach to eating is one according to
virtue. The pertinent virtue is temperance because, as Aristotle pointed out, temperance has
to do with physical appetites, or brutish, as he put it in the Ethics. A temperate individual is
one whose approach to eating is measured by reason. The temperate individual eats food
that is conducive to health, and eats in moderation, ‘‘as long as they are not incompatible
with health or vigor, contrary with what is noble, or beyond his means’’. Temperate
individuals are not attracted to foods merely for the smell or taste or pleasure. Rather, they
eat in moderation, not to satisfy pleasure, but to be nourished. Temperate individuals always
choose those foods that are healthful. (Aristotle, 2002, Book III, 10–12).
What is important to consider is that my argument focuses on the current state of affairs in
affluent societies, where food is readily available and abundant. My argument relies on
current scientific data showing that plant-based diets are optimal at any stage of life. (Craig,
W. J. & Mangels, A. R., 2009) According to the American Dietetic Association
“appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan diets, are
healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits in the prevention and
treatment of certain diseases.” (Tuso et al. 2013, p. 61), Thus, animal food is not necessary
for good health. In fact, the contrary is true; the current scientific literature constantly
reminds us that consuming animal food is always associated with many health problems,
such as heart disease, diabetes, obesity, atherosclerosis formation, cancer, and more.
(Bouvard et al. 2015) I anticipate resistance here. Many people believe that although
scientific research speaks negatively about animal food, it does not mean that we need to
abandon it altogether. It is all too often said that there is such a thing as eating in
moderation. In fact, in an earlier version of this paper, a referee made the following
comment: “The fact that a diet rich in beef correlates with increased risk of heart disease
does not mean that, for health reasons, one should avoid eating any beef at all, let alone all
meats including fish.”
The first point that I want to make is that, to be correct, the scientific research on animal
food consumption’s effects on human health doesn’t show that beef correlates just with
increased risk of heart disease; rather, it shows an increased risk of heart disease, cancer,
diabetes, high blood pressure, and cognitive decline, among many other issues. Secondly,
the research clearly shows that beef is not the only culprit. For example, a recent study, with
the self-explanatory title, “Fish Intake Is Positively Associated with Breast Cancer
Incidence Rate” concludes that, “higher intakes of fish were significantly associated with
higher incidence rates of breast cancer.” (Stripp et al. 2003, p. 3664) Although red meats are
the most dangerous, all meats, including farm-raised fish, as well as other animal products,
correlate with increased risk of health problems. Not surprisingly, entities such as The
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American Institute for Cancer Research, for example, recommends reducing consumption of
red meats, having meat-less days, and avoiding processed meats completely. And the last
point: if the fact that consuming meat correlates with increased risk of many diseases does
not mean that meat should be avoided, I wonder what does. Obviously, in the end people are
free to choose their diet. But if science consistently shows that animal food is known to
cause many health problems, the sensible thing to do is to avoid animal food. Why eat a
food that has the potential to cause health problems in the first place. If something is
potentially dangerous, the notion of moderation just does not apply.
Thus the conclusion that a temperate person avoids animal food, lab-grown or otherwise,
follows from the following premises: (1) Animal food has been shown to cause a plethora of
health problems. (2) It seems to be the sensible thing to do to avoid even in moderation a
food that is dangerous for our health. For example, smoking a pack of cigarettes once per
month or once a year may not be as deadly as, say, smoking two packs a day. But it seems
(to me at least) sensible not to smoke at all to avoid health problems. (3) Fresh fruit and
vegetables are never dangerous for our health, even when consumed in abundance. (4) A
diet completely devoid of animal food is optimal—in fact desirable—at any stage of life and
can prevent the aforementioned diseases. (5) Animal food has a deleterious impact upon the
environment. (Of course, this premise, would not apply to in vitro meat under the
assumption of the desirable outcome thesis.) (6) Alienation from nature is not conducive to
flourishing, and producing lab-grown meat alienates us from nature. And (7) Giving up
animal food when we have an abundance of readily available plant food is not a sacrifice of
taste or nutrition since plant food is quite exquisite, nutritious, and abundant. Here I am not
arguing that taste is irrelevant. One has to weigh taste against other factors, factors that in
my view are obviously more important. We have to consider that taste can be easily
adjusted, and that the taste of meat is not superior to the taste of plant-based food.
Consequently, the temperate individual will consume food that is essential to flourishing,
and not primarily for its taste. From the point of view of temperance, since meat is not
required for good health—in fact, it should be avoided whenever possible—eating meat
whether lab-grown or farm-grown, should be avoided and not ethically supported. As I hope
it will emerge from my discussion, the idea of growing meat in laboratories evinces lack of
temperance; thus, in this sense I believe that ethical vegans should regard the prospect of
lab-grown meat as an expression of intemperance, even under the assumption of the
desirable outcome thesis. In what follows, I will discuss some of the negative aspects of the
issue and later explore the possibility that considering lab-grown meat is a moral mistake
that we might be able to see by embracing a virtue-oriented ethics.
The project of in vitro meat is typically addressed within the moral framework of
consequentialist and deontic ethics (or some variations of these two). Considered from a
consequentialist standpoint, the question of the morality of lab-grown meat would seem
quite clear-cut. According to consequentialist ethics, an action is right just if its
consequences lead to the promotion of maximum utility. Assuming the desirable outcome
thesis, a consequentialist would certainly approve in vitro meat. Under this assumption,
animal suffering would be dramatically reduced or perhaps even eliminated while meat
eaters would have their fix and be happy. This scenario seems to be ideal from a utilitarian
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point of view. And in such a case, it would be the end of the story. Rights theorists or
deontologists would differ in their approach from utilitarians, in the sense that the goal of
deontology is to do the right thing for the right reason. But it would seem that even
deontologists would have no problem supporting production of lab-meat. What I suggest,
however, is that the story does not end here if we consider it from the standpoint of a virtuebased approach.
Before I consider my approach, I want to briefly discuss certain difficulties regarding the
desirable outcome thesis. One issue is that to be really cruelty-free, it might be suggested, it
should be animal-free. The challenge at present is for scientists to find a method of selfrenewing stem cells and animal-free materials to accomplish the growth of synthetic meat.
Very roughly explained, cells are taken from a living animal and allowed to grow in a Petri
dish in a laboratory. In practical terms, the initial harvested cells are taken from animals that
are raised according to specification so that their flesh can be genetically replicated in a lab.
But is that the end of the process? Are animals off the hook after that (pun intended)? Dr.
Post points out that, “the most efficient way of taking the process forward would still
involve slaughter, [using a] limited herd of donor animals.” (Collins 2012, 19 Feb 2019,
para. 10) Granted, the number of animals involved could be reduced. It will not, however,
dispense altogether with the use of animals. Scientists are working to create synthesized
meat from an initial biopsy and get it going without resorting to further harvesting. If that
were the case, (and of course at this point it is just speculation) one worry is that meat eaters
might see that the sky is the limit when it comes to variety and taste. I want to be very
careful here not to suggest something that might be understood as a fallacious slipperyslope; but at that point, if growing meat becomes as easy as researchers hope it to be, why
not clone any kind of animal meat, including, but not limited to, wild animals. And what
would be a moral objection to lab-grown human meat? Obviously it would be a lab product,
but nevertheless could taste like human flesh and could be marketed as such. Certainly some
might argue that as long as people are not exploited or hurt in the process, squeamishness
aside, there is nothing wrong with lab-grown human meat. But is this the direction that we
are willing to take in order to satisfy our culinary extravagance? It is possible that lab meat
producers would start harvesting cells from all kinds of animals (including human animals)
and breeding or even cross-breeding exotic animals, which would take us right back to
square one and, once again, require breeding animals for food.
If scientists could overcome these difficulties, shouldn’t vegans and animal rights activists
accept in vitro meat as a morally viable project? I think that the answer to this, and similar
questions, is predicated upon the kind of idea one assumes about morality. It depends on the
moral outlook from which the issue of cultured meat is considered. As Anscombe (1958)
pointed out in her frequently cited article, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” ethics is typically
done by assuming the notion of obligation or moral ought. She writes, “It would be a great
improvement if, instead of ‘morally wrong,’ one always named a genus such as ‘untruthful,’
‘unchaste,’ ‘unjust’.” (p. 89) The important message of Anscombe and many other likeminded philosophers is that moral problems require the kind of attention to human character
that a virtue-based theory can offer. It seems to me that the question of the morality of
producing and consuming cultured meat is typically dealt with by a consideration of our
duty or consideration of rights. Robert Louden (1984), referring to Anscombe’s remark,
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writes, “But are we to take the assertion literally, and actually attempt to do moral theory
without any concept of duty?” (p. 228) As far as I understand Anscombe, I do not think that
she meant that we should do away with duty altogether. Perhaps I am wrong about what
Anscombe really meant, but I am not suggesting here that duty is an unimportant aspect in
morality. Rather, I want to suggest that in many cases trying to figure out our duty leads us
nowhere. In the present issue, what is our duty? Ought we not to preserve the environment?
Ought we not to avoid injustice and gratuitous suffering? The answer seems obviously
“yes.” And if lab-grown meat is capable of achieving such goals, then we have a duty to
support lab-grown meat; consequently, according to duty ethics, that’s the end of the story.
But I think that a virtue-oriented approach is the correct framework to make sense of this
issue because it enables us to see aspects of moral issues that are simply discounted by the
duty or the maximum happiness approaches.
AQ2

To see why the question of whether lab-grown meat is morally viable requires the attention
of virtue ethics, I want to discuss the famous article “Virtue Theory and Abortion” by
Rosalind Hursthouse, in which she discusses the morality of abortion in a way that parallels
my argument here; that “abortion is commonly discussed in relation to just two
considerations: first …the status of the fetus…; secondly …women’s rights…Virtue theory
quite transforms the discussion of abortion by dismissing the two familiar dominating
considerations as, in a way, fundamentally irrelevant.” (Hursthouse 1991, p. 233) And it
seems to me that the question of the morality of cultured meat is often approached in
relation to our duty or to the best consequences. No reference is ever made to virtue and
character. Hursthouse’s argument is that considering an issue such as abortion in the light of
rights or duty is not helpful at all. In the case of abortion, questions of the status of the fetus
and of women’s rights are two of the most complicated questions in morality. The status of
the fetus is a very controversial issue that may never be settled. And how far should the
rights of women go is not a straightforward issue either. Virtue ethics focuses on whether or
not our actions are in accordance with certain admirable character traits. Because every
situation is different, it is often very hard to be able to figure out what our duty is. A
woman’s pregnancy could be the result of an accident, of rape, or of love. Consequently,
whether abortion is right or not depends on the nature of that specific case.
Hursthouse points out that her analysis of the morality of abortion is distinct from a
question about whether women “have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies” precisely
because “in exercising a moral right I can do something cruel, or callous, or selfish, lightminded, self-righteous, stupid, inconsiderate, disloyal, dishonest–that is, act viciously.” (p.
235) Reasonable judgment, Hursthouse notes, ought to be made on the basis of “familiar
biological facts,” which are “the facts that most human societies are and have been familiar
with…”, namely, “standardly (but not invariably), pregnancy occurs as the result of sexual
intercourse, that it lasts about 9 months, during which time the fetus grows and develops,
that standardly it terminates in the birth of a living baby, and that this is how we all come to
be” (p. 236).
Considering these facts, Hursthouse suggests, the question should be, “How do these
familiar biological facts figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and
reactions, of the virtuous and the non-virtuous? What is the mark to having the right attitude
to these facts and what manifests having the wrong attitude to them?” (p. 237) Her starting
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point is to note that abortion is a serious matter because it concerns “in some sense, the
cutting off of a new human life.” To dismiss it forthright reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of what is at stake. Accordingly, “to think of abortion as nothing but the
killing of something that does not matter, or as nothing but the exercise of some right…or as
the incidental means to some desirable state of affairs, is to do something callous and lightminded, the sort of thing that no virtuous and wise person would do.” (p. 237–238)
Deontological and utilitarian approaches, Hursthouse points out, are inadequate to
appreciating the seriousness of life and of what is at stake in abortion.
It is necessary to take into account and weigh certain goods, such as the value of the human
life that is cut off with abortion, the value of motherhood/parenthood for a woman, and the
contribution of these factors to living a good, noble human life. Therefore, in order to be
valid, a choice for abortion in a particular case must be granted by a desire to obtain or
preserve goods that are superior to those goods that abortion cuts off.
The central issue in evaluating whether or not abortion is permissible is essentially a
question of whether or not a woman exhibits a virtuous or vicious character; whether or not
a woman understands the nature of the real goods that abortion generally cuts off. If one is
knowingly sacrificing these goods in order to follow “other worthwhile pursuits” conducive
to flourishing, which are incompatible with having a child, or because a pregnancy would
place excessive burdens on her (especially in light of health issues of a woman) she is not
thereby manifesting a vicious character, and therefore her choice of abortion may be
justified.
So, what can be learned from Hursthouse’s discussion of the morality of abortion that is
valuable to the question of the morality of cultured meat? I believe that when we approach
the desirable outcome thesis with a similar attitude as that proposed by Hursthouse toward
abortion, we are immediately prompted to view the issue of cultured meat from a
completely new angle; and we may realize that this new view features important issues that
we have not yet contemplated. Approaching in vitro meat from a virtue-based perspective
means weighing the goods that in vitro meat can generate against those goods that it cuts
off. While in vitro meat could generate some goods in the way of reduced suffering and
environmental benefit, the goods that it cuts off are too important to support in vitro meat. In
my view, in vitro meat leads to our alienation from nature through dependence on
technology, and perpetrates an attitude toward animals that sees them as means to our end—
and that end is taste.
Considering that meat is not a requirement for good health, in fact, quite to the contrary,
science shows that animal products can be harmful to human health, and considering that
taste can easily be adjusted to plant food, rather than proposing meat grown in a lab, our
efforts as a civilization should be pursuing ways to move toward a plant-based diet. Is it
possible that we have made such a mess of things in the world by first bringing into
existence millions of animals for food resulting in the possibly irreversible degradation of
the environment and of our health that we now are contemplating eating lab-made food? It
seems to me that cloning meat is just another step toward our alienation from nature. As
Bhat et al. (2014) point out,
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Another problem with the in vitro meat production system is that it may
alienate us from nature and animals and can be a step in our retreat from
nature to live in cities. Cultured meat fits in with an increasing dependence on
technology, and the worry is that this comes with an ever greater
estrangement from nature. In the absence of livestock based farming, fewer
areas of land will be affected by human activities which is good for nature but
it may at the same time alienate us from nature. (p. 9)
I think we can and should do better than that. I believe that the enthusiasm about lab-grown
meat is mostly due to self-indulgence as well as shortsightedness. We should ask ourselves
whether the mere taste of a food is so important that we are willing to produce it in a
laboratory rather than adjusting our taste to plant food.
What I am referring to above involves the virtue of temperance, or lack thereof. The virtue
of temperance can be understood, as Aristotle noted, by its connection with animality. For
Aristotle, human beings are animals endowed with reason. As animals, they are naturally
subject to appetites for food, drink, sex, and more. They are sensitive to the pleasures that
the satisfaction of such appetites can bring. Since our animality is not the distinguishing
aspect of our humanity, physical pleasures should not be of major importance to us.
However, humans are susceptible to these pleasures because our animality is part of our
essence. In other words, insofar as we are part animals and part rational beings, we have to
deal with all kinds of physical pleasures in a way that harmonize with reason.
Temperate people relate properly to their animality, and give the proper worth to animalistic
pleasures. Insensible, self-indulgent, or intemperate individuals, in their respective way,
misjudge the importance of certain pleasures and misjudge themselves. Intemperate people
place too much importance to the pleasures of food and drink. In vitro meat, it seems to me,
is a perfect example of self-indulgence. We are supposed to eat and drink, primarily,
because we require nourishment. Thanks to the ease of modern civilization, people who live
in affluent societies, in my view, have lost sight of this fact and have placed too much
importance to food. Food nowadays, for those of us who live comfortably, is more than fuel
for the body. Here I do not at all intend to downplay the role of “taste” in a flourishing
human life. I emphasized that we are supposed to eat and drink primarily because we
require nourishment. But I want people to really enjoy the flavor (taste and olfaction) of the
foods they eat—but food that comes at no cost to our health and to the environment. And I
would say that temperance lies more in eating the right types of food in the right quantities.
My point here is, however, how important is to satisfy our taste for meat that we are willing
to create and consume lab-grown food? How should a virtuous person approach this
situation? What behavior is consistent with temperance? I am not contemplating
philosophical hypotheticals here. I am speaking practically: plant-based food is very
delicious and nutritious, healthful, abundant, safe for us, and sustainable for the
environment. Moreover, animal food is not safe; and while the taste of meat
may be incredibly satisfying to many, it does not seem to me that, compared with plantbased food, meat is so sublime that life without it would not be worth living. The increasing
number of people who become vegans and live happily is testimony that the taste of meat is
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not very important. Thus, these considerations represent good reasons to show that the
temperate individual would reject the desirable outcome thesis of in vitro meat; and that in
vitro meat is motivated by intemperance.
Food is necessary and pleasurable. But humans can (and indeed do) have the wrong desire
for it. Generally, in affluent societies the wrong desire for food is manifested by the
extravagance and excess of food that people eat. According to the Office of Disease
Prevention and Health Promotion’s dietary guidelines 2015–2020, “The typical eating
patterns currently consumed by many in the United States do not align with the Dietary
Guidelines.” (“Current Eating Patterns”, 2015, para. 1) To say that eating patterns in the US
“do not align with the dietary guidelines” is a very mild way to put it when we consider that,
“About three-fourths of the population” consumes a low amount of fruit and vegetables.
Also, “More than half of the population is meeting or exceeding total grain and total protein
foods recommendations, [and] are not meeting the recommendations for the subgroups
within each of these food groups.” In particular, “most Americans exceed the
recommendations for added sugars, and saturated fats.” (Para. 1) And saturated fats come
mainly from animal sources, including meat and dairy products. Furthermore, “the eating
patterns of many are too high in calories…The high percentage of the population that is
overweight or obese suggests that many in the United States overconsume calories…more
than two-thirds of all adults and nearly one-third of all children and youth in the United
States are either overweight or obese.” (Para. 1) These facts in my view clearly show that
something about our relationship with food has gone completely wrong. These facts are not
surprising considering that the idea of food, for many reasons and by many factors, has been
distorted.
It seems clear that it is the lack of temperance that makes humans indulge in the wrong food
and in the wrong way. Furthermore, self-indulgence leads to pain, more than it is required,
when certain foods are missed. The self-indulgent value food too highly, choosing it at the
cost of health. Thus, in relation to the bodily pleasure of food, one can be self-indulgent,
weak-willed, self-controlled, temperate, or insensible. The temperate person will choose
what is pleasant and conducive to health, which is in its turn conducive to flourishing.
Consequently, since strong desires for food can easily lead us to destroying our health, the
temperate person desires simple food and in moderation. When we survey the health
sciences, it is clear that the only foods that can lower and prevent many health problems are
fruits and vegetables. (Harvard T.H. Chan. School of Public Health, "Vegetables and
Fruits" 2019) In fact, as far as I have researched, I have never seen any study, or heard any
medical professional, recommend eating fruit and vegetables with caution while enjoying
animal products.
Synthesizing meat also opens the door to the variety of meat that can be produced. It seems
plausible that if laboratories crack the code and succeed in creating perfect replicas of
meats, the next step would very likely be replicating the flesh of endangered species, wild
animals, and alas, humans. Cannibalism is not a desirable practice in modern society and not
only because the very idea of it is repulsive, but also because it can cause a disease known as
Kuru (Gajdusek and Zigas 1957). But what if human flesh could be replicated without the
risk of any disease? Although human flesh might be unlikely to become a popular dish,
given the curiosity of human beings, there is still the prospect of cloning it for human
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consumption. This may sound like a slippery slope objection to lab-grown meat, but I don’t
think that it is in this case. I do not intend to pursue this as the main argument against labgrown meat, however, but rather use the discussion to illustrate the kind of irrational path to
which cloning meat leads.
But what exactly is the problem with cannibalism? Schaefer and Savulescu (2014) point out
that,
The most obvious reaction to this possibility of human [in vitro meat] is to
ban it. Just as, for instance, cloning is banned in the 13 US states and the
European Union for moral reasons, we could put in place strict restrictions on
the synthesis of human flesh for the purpose of consumption. Given common
revulsion at the prospect of cannibalism, this reaction is indeed rather likely.
However, it is too quick—we should ask first, what is so wrong with
cannibalism of artificially created human cells and tissue that it must be
banned? (p. 197)
Here they point out that despite our gut-feeling sense that cannibalism is wrong, in the end
there is no good argument against eating human flesh as it merely amounts to feeling of
disgust. In fact, cannibalism is morally objectionable because it (typically but not always)
involves killing a person, and the desecration of a corpse. But if human flesh is cloned in a
laboratory, then there is no killing or desecration involved. To produce in vitro human flesh
for human consumption it would be required harvesting cells from people who are willing to
donate their cells. In fact, this process may even become lucrative for many people who
might be paid for their cells. At that point then, what would be wrong with eating human
flesh?
Could it be disrespect toward humanity? Since there are no human beings required in the
production of a hypothetical in vitro human flesh, no disrespect could be done. Schaefer and
Savulescu thus conclude that if we are worried about in vitro meat because of cannibalism,
we should not worry at all because such meat will be free of cruelty and disrespect—end of
the story. Therefore, the objections that are typically raised against lab-grown meat rely on
violation of respect and disgust, but they are not strong enough to reject the project of
cloning meat for human consumption. Fewer animals being slaughtered, less animal
suffering, less pollution, among many other factors, in their view, are powerful enough
arguments showing that we should support research into cultured meat.
As I already pointed out at the outset, it seems that there is a prevailing view about the
moral viability of producing lab-grown meat that hinges on broadly consequentialist and
deontic principles. Virtue ethics is not necessarily against the best consequences or the
notion of rights. However, those should not be the only aspects that matter. As we have seen
in the discussion of Hursthouse’s view on abortion, sometimes in the name of the best
consequences or in the name of our rights, we might act in ways that are callous, selfindulgent, selfish, and so on. Thus, it would certainly be an admirable prospect to reduce
suffering and care for the environment. But is cloning meat the right way to accomplish
those things? I would like to suggest what a virtue-oriented approach could add to the
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discussion, and in so doing I will address cannibalism in particular, though the larger scope
is to address in vitro meat. What I would like to suggest is something along the lines of what
Leon Kass refers to as “the wisdom of repugnance”, which is the same concept that Mary
Midgley and others call the “yuck factor.” This is the notion that a strong, negative reaction
of disgust to a practice is in fact good enough evidence that such a practice is not morally
sound or that there is something intrinsically wrong with it. In “Danger to Human Dignity:
the Revival of Disgust and Shame in the Law” Nussbaum (2004) points out that the “yuck
factor” or disgust has been used in many arguments throughout history as a justification for
evil practices and institutions, such as slavery, torture, antisemitism, gender and sexual
discrimination, and so on. But it seems to me, and many others, that just because feeling of
disgust may lead to the wrong conclusion, it does not follow that this feeling should be
discounted forthright. There are cases and cases. Our feeling of revulsion may not be in
itself an argument against a practice, but it certainly signals that something requires our
attention because it might be morally wrong. Surely we can in many cases supply reason to
this feeling and construct an argument. But even in the case that a fully articulated argument
is not forthcoming, I do not think that in certain cases one is not entitled to reject a practice,
like in this case in vitro meat, on the basis of disgust. In fact, Kass (1997) seems to think so,
as he argues the following about the feeling of revulsion,
Revulsion is not an argument; and some of yesterday’s repugnances are today
calmly accepted—though, one must add, not always for the better. In crucial
cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom,
beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it. Can anyone really give an
argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest (even
with consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or eating
human flesh, or even just (just!) raping or murdering another human being?
Would anybody’s failure to give full rational justification for his or her
revulsion at these practices make that revulsion ethically suspect? Not at all.
On the contrary, we are suspicious of those who think that they can
rationalize away our horror, say, by trying to explain the enormity of incest
with arguments only about the genetic risks of inbreeding. (p. 20)
The natural feeling of repugnance at cannibalism, and in general at lab-grown meat, belongs
in this category. We are repelled by the prospect of cannibalism and cloned meat because
we feel directly that such a practice violates our moral virtues by overemphasizing the
importance of taste and by ultimately alienating us from nature. What kind of person am I to
support artificial meat when it is possible—in fact it is preferable—to thrive eating plants
and fruit? Is the taste of meat so important that we are willing to allow technology to take
over our lives to the point of manufacturing flesh? These are some of the questions that are
part of that feeling of disgust. Repugnance, thus, is a natural reaction against the excesses of
human willfulness to distance itself from nature. In this case, I believe, the repugnance
expressed at the prospect of producing meat artificially is justified. Conversely, in the cases
of sexism, racism, slavery, and other forms of discrimination, our feeling of repugnance is
not justified because it stems from contempt, anger, and self-delusion. But, in the case of
cultured meat, repugnance is the cry out of our human nature that is being overtaken and
changed by technology, the blind hunger for innovation, profit, and self-indulgence.
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So why is repugnance at lab-grown meat a morally legitimate reaction? To answer this
question, I would go back to what I have been describing throughout this paper. It is true
that as Nussbaum states repugnance has been used in history to justify evil things. Granted,
but firstly it is quite clear that the case of repugnance at in vitro meat does not involve any
form of evil or discrimination. Secondly, the sense of repugnance that I refer to in the case
of lab-grown meat is not unfounded; after all, it is corroborated by those factors previously
discussed: the fear of alienation from nature, and the fear that the quest for technological
advance rather than careful moral consideration is corrupting our moral character, our
temperance, to the point of overestimating the importance of taste. Indeed, taste is
important, but not so much that we are willing to create laboratory food when we have
access to readily available, nutritious, exquisite, healthful, suffering-free, and sustainable
plant food. These are good reasons why we are repelled by cannibalism and in vitro meat.
That is, such practices stem from the legitimate fear of estrangement from our nature in the
way of becoming dependent on lab-grown food. We should not allow technology to modify
our nature such that we start eating lab-grown food. We should not, if we worry about our
moral character, if we are temperate, sensible, and compassionate, allow technology to turn
the world into a place where all kinds of meat—including human meat—are produced in a
laboratory. Are these practices conducive to our flourishing? Is the taste of meat so
important that we are willing to come to this? I think not. In my view the temperate and
most practical approach is to harmonize with nature, not exploit animals, and consume
plant-based food.
As a concluding remark, I would like to point out that my discussion about the morality of
producing and eating lab-grown meat is supposed to illustrate what a virtue-oriented theory
can add to the discussion. Moreover, it is a view that the ethical vegan might take with
respect to the morality of in vitro meat. Ethical veganism, as I understand it, is the rejection
of animal-based products as food, whether these products come from living animals or a lab.
Ethical veganism should be based on virtue rather than deontic or consequentialist
principles. Ethical veganism should be the embodiment of virtue and thus should reject the
notion of using animals for our taste and pleasure because doing so evinces lack of
temperance, compassion, fairness, and magnanimity. (Alvaro, 2017, 2019) Consequently, an
ethical vegan should not support the production of any kind of meat. However, not all
vegans think this way. For example, Ingrid Newkirk, founder and president of People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), offered $1 million to successful production of labgrown meat. (Phillips 2009, para. 2) As an ethical vegan, this seems to me a peculiar and
sad form of veganism. In my view, the reason for this schism among vegans is due to the
fact that the question of the morality of lab-grown meat has been framed typically in terms
of potential future gains, which seems to me to be an approach of consequentialist nature; or
another typical approach is of deontic nature. These approaches seek to rationalize the
question of lab-grown meat, and certainly in their way they seem to achieve the goal of
demonstrating that cloning meat for human consumption is morally viable and makes a lot
of sense to support the project. After all, aren’t less pollution and fewer animals suffering
what we all want?
AQ3

Yes, but as I hope to have shown, while those are important factors, they are not the only
factors to be considered. Focusing only on those factors may lead to a tunnel-vision-like

C. Alvaro 13

understanding of the issue. The contribution of a virtue-oriented approach is to show that,
for example, the way we are going about reducing suffering and environmental degradation
seems to completely disregard the importance of having an admirable character. In
particular, the obstinate attitude of wanting meat at all costs by producing it in laboratories
evinces a profound lack of temperance. Hocquette (2016) aptly concludes, “the global
scientific community including the proponents of artificial meat themselves recognize the
hurdles to overcome so that artificial meat can progress to the industrial stage (new
formulation of culture media, development of giant incubators, safety assessment for human
consumption, etc.). (p. 8) Also he notes that there are other alternatives to cultured meat
“faster to develop in the short term and more effective in responding to today’s issues (in
particular it is the case of the reduction of waste) compared to artificial meat which still
needs a great deal of research.” (p. 9) A viable solution is, of course, that of plant-based
meat substitutes, though in my view it would be more sustainable in the long run if we take
steps toward abandoning what I regard as a primitive idea of animals as human food.
In light of the difficulties involved in the research for the production of viable in vitro meat,
the virtue-oriented approach that I suggest is to ask the following questions: Is the taste of
meat so important for humans that we are willing to alienate ourselves from nature more and
more by producing food in laboratories? Is meat so important that we are willing to continue
what Melanie Joy (2001) refers to as the culture of carnism? (p. 126–127) Is it necessary that
we produce synthetic meat to “save” the environment and reduce animal cruelty and
suffering when it would be much easier to adopt plant-based diets? My answer to these
questions, of course, is no. Critics may, naturally, object to many of the points I made; but
the overall point of my discussion has been that virtue theory has the resources to show why
we should not support in vitro meat; also, my aim was to show that moral issues are better
understood when framed in terms of virtue and vice rather than in terms of best
consequences or of rights. The question of the morality of in vitro meat is typically
addressed from the point of view of what is practical or what is our obligation. As I hope to
have shown, approaching the question from a virtue-based perspective reveals to us an
aspect of the issue that is often ignored or downplayed, and that is, moral character. What I
have argued is that the virtue of temperance in particular shows us the basis for rejecting in
vitro meat, even under the assumption that it delivers what it promises.
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.

C. Alvaro 14

References
Alvaro, C. (2019). Ethical Veganism, Virtue Ethics, and the Great Soul, Lexington Books.
Alvaro, C. (2017). Veganism as a virtue: How compassion and fairness show us what is
virtuous about veganism. Future of Food: Journal on Food, Agriculture and Society, 5(2),
16–26.
Alvaro, C. (2017). Ethical veganism, virtue, and greatness of the soul. Journal of Agricultural
and Environmental Ethics, 30(6), 765–781.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33(124), 1–19.
Aristotle. (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. Sarah Broadie, Christopher Rowe (Eds.). Oxford
University Press.
Bhat, Z., Kumar, S., & Fayaz, H. (2014). In vitro meat production: Challenges and benefits
over conventional meat production. Journal of Integrative
Agriculture, 14, 241. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2095-3119(14)60887-x.
Bouvard, V., Loomis, D., Guyton, K. Z., et al. (2015). Carcinogenicity of consumption of
red and processed meat. The lancet Oncology, 16, 1599. https://doi.org/10.1016/s14702045(15)00444-1.
Collins, N. (2012). Test tube hamburgers to be served this year. The Telegraph, 19, 349.
Craig, W. J., & Mangels, A. R. (2009). Position of the American Dietetic Association:
Vegetarian diets. American Dietetic Association, 109(7), 1266–1282.
AQ5

Current Eating Patterns in the United States. (2015). Dietary Guidelines 2015–
2020. https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/guidelines/chapter-2/current-eatingpatterns-in-the-united-states/#current-eating-patterns-in-the-united-states.
Gajdusek, D. C., & Zigas, V. (1957). Degenerative disease of the central nervous system in
New Guinea. The endemic occurrence of “kuru” in the native population. New England
Journal of Medicine, 257, 974–978.
Hocquette, J. F. (2016). Is in vitro meat the solution for the future? Meat Science, 120, 167–
176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.meatsci.2016.04.036.
Hursthouse, R. (1991). Virtue Theory and Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20(3),
223–246.
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (n.d.). Health & Environmental Implications
of U.S. Meat Consumption & Production. https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-andinstitutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-alivablefuture/projects/meatless_monday/resources/meat_consumption.html. Accessed June 3,
2018

C. Alvaro 15

Joy, M. (2001). From carnivore to carnist: liberating the language of meat. Satya., 18(2),
126–127.
Kass, L. (1997). The Wisdom of Repugnance. The New Republic, 216(22), 17.
Nussbaum, M. (2004). Danger to human dignity: The revival of disgust and shame in the
law. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 50, B6.
Phillips, A. (2009). PETA Offers $1 M Prize for lab-grown meat. ABC News.
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=4704447&page=1. Accessed February 2, 2019.
Schaefer, G. O., & Savulescu, J. (2014). The ethics of producing in vitro meat. Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 31(2), 188–202. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12056.
Stripp, C., Overvad, K., Christensen, J., Thomsen, B. L., Olsen, A., Møller, S., et al. (2003).
Fish intake is positively associated with breast cancer incidence rate. The Journal of
Nutrition, 133(11), 3664–3669. https://doi.org/10.1093/jn/133.11.3664.
AQ7

Tuso, P. J., Ismail, M. H., Ha, B. P., & Bartolotto, C. (2013). Nutritional update for
physicians: Plant-based diets. The Permanente Journal, 17(2), 61–
66. https://doi.org/10.7812/TPP/12-085.
Vegetables and Fruits. (2019). Harvard T.H. Chan. School of Public Health. The Nutrition
Source. https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/what-should-you-eat/vegetables-andfruits/.
Vogel, G. (2010). Organs made to order. SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, August
2010. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/organs-made-to-order-863675/.

